

NEAR EAST/AFRICA DIVISION  
OFFICE OF REPORTS AND ESTIMATES  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WORKING PAPER

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NEAR EAST/AFRICA DIVISION

INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

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For Week Ending  
22 November 1949

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## NEAR EAST/AFRICA INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

### GREECE

Getting back to normal: The waning of the military emergency is producing a widespread psychological letdown in Greece. Despite general awareness that a potential Communist threat still exists and that urgent economic and social problems remain to be solved, signs of lessening concern for the national interest are evident practically everywhere; even the combat troops have apparently grown somewhat less vigilant now that all but about 1,500 guerrillas have been temporarily eliminated from the internal scene. With the pressure for national unity lessened and the 1950 elections approaching, the stability of the present Populist-Liberal-Unionist coalition government is declining. Members of the Liberal and Populist Parties are becoming increasingly vocal in their partisan objections to the terms of the coalition, while a tendency toward political fragmentation and new alignments is indicated by such developments as the defection from his party by one of the leading Populists last week. Although the two parties may be led to compose some of their differences in their common fear of a pre-election service government under Marshal Papagos (for which certain elements are increasing their pressure), the party leaders will probably find it more and more difficult to hold their followers in line. Meanwhile, the stability of the government is also being strained by a new surge of labor unrest, with the unions now vigorously advancing huge demands long deferred because of the military situation. Given the present psychological atmosphere, the appeals for national unity which the government formerly had to use with monotonous regularity may well prove to be not only useless but politically inexpedient.

### TURKEY

Alleged plot against Inonu: Although reports are incomplete on the plot against President Inonu allegedly fomented by a few prominent members of the opposition Nation Party, the government's accusations seem to be based on very slight foundations. Nation Party members, whose hatred of Inonu probably accounts for the creation of the party, would like nothing better than to be rid of "that deaf old man," and indiscreet talk, prompted by wishful thinking, may well form the basis for the government's charges and arrests. It is hardly conceivable, however, that the alleged plotters believed the party capable of taking over the reins of government, as the government charges.

The government's tactics may succeed in smearing the Nation Party but not necessarily to the government's own gain. Many people who might

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otherwise have supported the party can easily give their allegiance to the much stronger Democratic Party, which is equally vigorous, if less violent, in its opposition to the government. Moreover, if the prosecutors are unable to make a convincing case of the allegations, the whole affair may boomerang, discrediting the government party itself in the eyes of many loyal Turks.

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
**Election results:** Last week's parliamentary elections failed to provide a clear-cut test of political strength in Syria. On the surface, the balloting represents a victory for the incumbent Populist Party (whose 50-odd deputies represent the only major bloc in the new 114-seat Constituent Assembly) and thus confirms the shift in control of the government from the conservative Damascus politicians of the pre-Zaim era to a more vigorous element which is particularly strong in the rival city of Aleppo. The fact that most of the old-line political leaders boycotted the voting, the apathy of the electorate, and the persistence of army intriguing all indicate, however, that the political undercurrent remains strong in Syria. In order to appease the various discordant elements, the Populists may have to give up some of their relatively progressive plans for the country--if they are not first turned out of office by still another coup d'etat.

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#### IRAN

Tudeh activities: Signs of renewed vigor in Iran's outlawed Tudeh Party suggest Soviet exploitation of the general unrest precipitated by the Majlis elections and the assassination of Minister of Court Hajir, although the Iranian Government, with the help of the armed forces, is believed quite capable of coping with subversive activities in the country. While the Kremlin continues to manifest a benign official attitude toward Iran, underground activities of the Soviet-backed Tudeh have increased, party members have been stirring up trouble among Iranian laborers in the oil fields of nearby Kuwait, and a number of pro-Tudeh newspapers following the straight Communist line have appeared on Iranian newsstands. Whether the Tudeh Party had any part in Hajir's assassination has not yet been determined, but Soviet financial aid has reportedly been extended to at least one of the parliamentary opposition candidates said by the assassin to be implicated in the plot.

#### NOTED IN BRIEF

Sirry's non-party Egyptian Cabinet, abruptly appointed by King Farouk less than three weeks ago, has apparently justified its brief existence by finally scheduling parliamentary elections for 3 January. Moreover, the electoral arrangements made by the cabinet appear unlikely to attract serious opposition on the part of the press or public. (The Chamber of

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Deputies has been dissolved to avoid the necessity of a protracted debate on the matter.) The draft electoral law itself is reasonably fair to the majority (Wafd) party and to the leading minority parties (Saadists and Liberals). Furthermore, the cabinet's decision to reopen the voting lists, so that additional names may be added during December, seems to be a sufficient concession to meet Wafdist demands that the "forged" electoral voting lists be revised prior to any election.

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The Regent of Iraq continues to meet difficulties in obtaining a new premier. The Regent would be willing to have Ali Jawdat al-Ayubi, candidate of resigning Prime Minister Nuri, obtain the post on condition that Jawdat retain in the cabinet at least two of the old guard--Shakir el Wadi (who is alleged to control the army) and Nuri himself. Jawdat, however, wants a free hand to bring in several young reformists and may refuse the premiership under the Regent's conditions.

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Former Prime Minister Qavam of Iran is once again pulling strings in an effort to regain the premiership despite his seventy-seven years and chronic ill health. Although Qavam still has a strong following in Iran, it is improbable that he will succeed in restoring himself to power. To do so, he would need the support of the Shah, who, in a stronger position than ever before, would hardly consent to have an ambitious and domineering personality whom he has long distrusted obtain so important a post.

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